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Sense and Sensation: Exploring the Interplay Between the 
Semiotic and Performative Dimensions of Theatre
Erika Fischer-Lichte
The Semiotic and the Performative
In the 1970s, when the so-called linguistic, or semiotic, turn took place in the 
humanities, it opened up new possibilities for theatre research. Up to then, its main 
self-understanding had been that of a historical discipline analogous to art history 
and the history of literature. But whereas these disciplines regarded the analysis 
and interpretation of works of art from past epochs as their main task, a comparable 
approach was not open to theatre studies. Performances of the past are no longer 
accessible; they are gone and lost forever. The ephemeral and transitory nature of 
performance, which the German playwright and theoretician Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing referred to as early as the 18th century as theatre’s unique peculiarity, 
does not allow the analysis or interpretation of a past performance. It is possible 
to examine documents on a performance as well as the material traces left behind, 
such as the theatre building, stage sets, costumes, props, the text of a play, a score, 
reports or reviews on the performance, etc., but not the performance itself.
On the other hand, a performance, which was accessible, i.e. contemporary 
theatre, was not considered a suitable object of research. For while the literary 
scholar or the art historian is able to take recourse to the object of his study whenever 
it is needed and become absorbed in its details, contemplating it as long as he feels 
necessary, the performance is not at the theatre scholar’s disposal in a comparable 
way. Because of its ﬂeeting nature, any attempt to analyze it seems doomed to 
failure. Therefore, dealing with contemporary performances was left to theatre 
critics, while the scholar’s object of interest was taken from theatre history.
By the 1970s, when theatre scholars began to question this distribution of labor 
and tried to develop methods of analyzing a performance despite its ephemeral 
nature, semiotics provided them with a set of tools. Semiotically speaking, a 
performance can be deﬁned as a structured coherence of theatrical signs such as 
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scenic space, the bodily appearance of the actors, gestures, movements, language, 
sounds, music, and so on, and in this sense as a text–which does not mean the 
literary text of a play but a text made up of heterogeneous signs. Thus, semiotic 
methods could be applied to a performance.1
The central purpose of semiotic analysis was to search for possible meanings. It 
stemmed from the assumption that an unequivocal meaning can never be accorded to 
a performance—as it cannot to lyrics or a painting. It is ambiguous and polyvalent. 
Accordingly, it is open to most diverse processes of meaning generation. It is never 
the meaning of a gesture, action, scene, or the whole performance, but only one 
possible meaning from a generally large number of meanings generated with regard 
to the element in question. A semiotic analysis never strives to discover a uniﬁed 
meaning of performance or any one element of it. Even if one particular meaning 
is generated, this does not mean that all others are to be excluded. Rather, a choice 
is made with a view to the particular problem, question, hypothesis, or perspective 
under which the analysis is undertaken, for there is no such thing as a complete 
analysis. An analysis will always neglect elements of the performance which do not 
seem relevant in terms of the leading question of the analysis or which were simply 
not perceived at all, ﬁrst and foremost because an analysis is a dynamic process of 
relating elements of the performance to each other as well as to all kinds of elements 
to which the analyst may refer. Theoretically, this process can never come to an end. 
Instead, the end, created by the analyst, is somewhat arbitrary. Although theatre 
semiotics is sometimes blamed for being static, reducing the full range of possible 
meanings to one meaning only, for demanding clarity and not allowing ambiguity 
or even contradiction, for demanding a uniﬁed meaning, all such reproaches are 
pointless. If such a result has occurred, it has not followed from any restrictions in 
the semiotic approach per se, but from an inadequate application of it. 
Another reproach is that theatre semiotics ignores the particular materiality 
of theatrical signs. This does not hold true either, for a semiotic analysis always 
proceeds from the very materiality of the sign. However, it must be conceded that 
it is only considered with regard to its potential to serve as a sign—to produce 
meaning. This can, in fact, be seen as a certain limitation.
While the linguistic turn of the 1970s resulted in an understanding not only 
of theatre but quite generally of culture as a text made up of signs that have to be 
deciphered, the so-called performative turn of the 1990s brought forth another 
metaphor which, in some ways, is opposed to that of “culture as text”—the 
metaphor of “culture as performance.” In theatre studies, this resulted in a shift 
of focus from the semioticity of a performance to its performativity. This shift 
promised to overcome the limitations of theatre semiotics. From the perspective 
of performativity the interest is less in what the acts, actions, and movements of 
the performers mean than in how they are perceived and experienced, how they 
affect the spectators, and what kind of impact they have on them. Therefore, the 
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focus on performativity often requires another kind of approach, which considers 
these particular qualities of a performance as, for instance, a phenomenological 
approach might.
Whereas a semiotic approach concerns itself with the conditions under which 
meanings in a performance may emerge out of its performative processes and with the 
meanings that are conceivable and possible, a phenomenological approach focuses 
on the performative processes as such. While the semiotic approach asks, “What 
do the performative processes mean,” the performative approach instead raises 
the question, “What do they do?” Therefore a semiotic analysis of a performance 
considers what is happening on stage as a text made up of theatrical signs that 
are to be interpreted. Analyses concerned with its performativity proceed from 
the eventness of a performance and highlight those performative processes which 
result in something happening between actors and spectators–that the spectators 
become colored, even affected and moved by what the actors/performers do. Hence 
it follows that the semiotic and the performative dimensions of a performance are 
different, although inextricably intertwined. They offer two different perspectives 
on the same object, the performance, which, ultimately cannot be separated from 
each other, and if so, only temporarily for heuristic reasons. I shall substantiate 
my argument by referring to Frank Castorf’s production of Trainspotting in the 
Volksbuehne am Rosa-Luxemburg-Platz Berlin in 1997.
Trainspotting
The production was a theatrical adaptation of Irvine Welsh‘s ﬁrst and highly 
successful novel, Trainspotting, and its adaptation in 1996 for a ﬁlm by Danny 
Boyle. Although it was presented in the Volksbuehne, a theatre building with a 
stage and an auditorium, it was not the given spatial arrangement that deﬁned the 
relationship between actors/performers and spectators, for the auditorium was not 
used at all. Instead the performance took place on the stage, and the spectators were 
seated on scaffolding at the back of the stage. To take their seats, they had to cross 
the stage, where some lighting equipment was laid out. Those spectators who had 
already taken their seats watched later arrivals stumble across the stage, sometimes 
destroying parts of the “set” though the ushers at the Volksbuehne had asked the 
spectators to watch their step when walking over the lighting equipment. Here, 
the spatial arrangement was used in order to redeﬁne the roles of the spectators–
obviously, the roles of spectator and actor were being played with. Whether they 
wanted to or not, the arriving spectators took on the roles of actors before the gaze 
of the spectators already seated. At the same time, the performance toyed with the 
conventions that mark the beginning of the performance. Did it start as soon as the 
ﬁrst spectator had reached the scaffolding and started to watch others arriving, or 
when the ﬁrst actor from the Volksbuehne entered the stage?
Right from the very beginning, the spectators were somewhat irritated about 
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their own role in the performance. They were seated on the stage—i.e., the place 
reserved for the actors, and those arriving later, in fact, acted before the eyes of the 
others. They were not free to decide on their own whether to become actors or to 
remain spectators—as in some sort of  “old-fashioned” audience participation—but 
rather in order to become spectators they ﬁrst had to act as performers. Stumbling 
over a faintly lit stage and accidentally disconnecting lighting cables while sensing 
the eyes of others staring at them, at least in some cases, resulted in a feeling of 
insecurity and awkwardness. In this way, the very process of entering the stage 
space in order to participate in a performance caused irritation. People who arrived 
in order to act as spectators were suddenly forced into the role of actors, which 
some apparently hated while others enjoyed the experience.
Moving over the stage in order to reach one’s place stimulated some to try 
and make sense of the whole procedure. What was the purpose of being made to 
appear on stage? Was it meant to point to the permanent change between the role 
of actor and performer we undergo in everyday life? Or did it hint at a particular 
involvement of the spectators in the story to be acted out later on by the Volksbuehne 
actors—perhaps in the sense of the old Tua res agitur? While for some the walk 
over the stage might have been experienced as somewhat destabilizing—having 
their clumsiness exposed to the gaze of others—the attempt to make sense of it 
surely contributed to a re-stabilization.
However, during the course of the performance, the spectators quickly 
recognized that having arrived at the scaffolding, taken their seats, and thus regained 
the role of spectator, they were by no means in a safe position. The four actors 
repeatedly provoked interaction with the spectators. One of the actors (Hendrik 
Arnst), a man of massive physical proportions playing the part of Frank, went 
up to one or another spectator from time to time, violently stamping the ground 
in a terrifying way, attacking her/him with aggressive remarks, bodily posture, 
or gestures. He abused a female spectator in the upper rows as “fucking bitch” 
and bellowed at her to stop her “idiotic gawping.” The reactions of the spectators 
were different at each performance. One spectator who was attacked obviously 
felt threatened and moved back, terriﬁed; he seemed to make himself smaller and 
in this way invisible, while the other spectators burst out laughing. This seemed 
to be a welcome pretext for the actor to launch another attack on the audience 
by shouting to them: “Shut up when the lady is going to speak!” whereupon the 
actress Kathrin Angerer, who played the part of Alison, took up her scolding aria 
on Frank, the “swine,” a second time. At another performance, the man addressed 
by the actor tried to ignore the attack, and the audience did not laugh. This time, 
the actor went back to the playing area, and the actress began her aria anew. On one 
occasion, during the performance ﬁrst mentioned, two spectators wanted to leave 
before the end and tried to sneak out unnoticed by the actors. One actor (Matthias 
Matschke) managed to run up to them before they could leave and took them to 
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task. He interrogated them as to why they did not like the performance and asked 
them to rethink their decision. When they determinedly opened the door and left 
without saying a word, he sent after them the rudest abuse—which the audience 
cheered. In any case, whatever happened, the spectators had a hard time claiming 
the position of distanced observers. The production did its utmost to make them part 
of the performance. The spectators experienced themselves as being determined 
by the course of the performance as it was not in their power to prevent the actors 
from addressing them directly, thus turning them into actors of the play. At the 
same time they experienced themselves as being able to co-determine the course 
of the performance by their observable reactions. On the one hand, this provoked 
a number of physiological, energetic, affective, or motor states in the spectators 
concerned; on the other, it raised the question of how to make sense of this kind 
of forced audience participation.
The bodily co-presence of actors and spectator
One possible meaning might have been created by making the spectators 
experience and, as a consequence, recognize that a performance always comes 
into existence through the bodily co-presence of actors and spectators who 
assemble at a certain time and place in order to share a situation, a moment in time. 
While those who “act”—“real” actors or spectators in the position of actors—do 
something—move through the space, perform gestures, manipulate objects, speak 
and sing—the spectators perceive them and react.
It may well be the case that such reactions are at least partly internal–
imaginative and cognitive—i.e., purely mental processes. However, most of the 
reactions and responses can be perceived by the actors and the other spectators, e.g., 
giggling, laughing, shouting, yawning, snoring, sobbing, crying, eating, drinking, 
commenting on what is happening, getting up, running out, and slamming the 
doors. The perception of such responses, in its turn, results in further perceptible 
reactions. Whatever the actors do, it has an effect on the spectators; and whatever 
the spectators do, it has an effect on the actors and other spectators. It can be 
concluded from this situation that a performance only comes into being through 
the interactions between actors and spectators. Hence it follows that its course 
cannot be completely planned or predicted and is, in fact, different each night. It 
is kind of an autopoietic process, which is characterized by differing degrees of 
contingency. Anything that occurs in the course of a performance cannot be entirely 
foreseen at its beginning. Many elements emerge in the course of a performance 
as a consequence of certain interactions.
 Of course, the actors on stage—and the director behind them—set the decisive 
preconditions for the progression of the performance—preconditions that are ﬁxed 
by the process of mise-en-scène. As director, Castorf decided on the place of the 
performance—the stage—and the special kind of “opening ceremony” that turned 
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most spectators into actors. And it was the actor Hendrik Arnst, for example, who 
decided when, how, and which of the spectators to address directly. Nonetheless, 
neither was in a position to control the course of the performance entirely. In the 
end, it is all participants together who generate the performance.
Therefore, the performance opens up the possibility for all participants to 
experience themselves in its course as subjects that are able to co-determine the 
actions and behavior of others, and whose own actions and behavior, in the same 
way, are determined by others. The individual participants—whether actor or 
spectator—experience themselves as subjects neither fully autonomous nor fully 
determined by others, subjects who accept responsibility for a situation which they 
take part in but have not created. This demonstrates that a theatre performance is 
also to be regarded as a social process in which different individuals and groups 
encounter, negotiate, and regulate their relationships in different ways.
This “interpretation” is backed up at the end of the performance. The actors tried 
hard to draw as much applause from the audience as possible in order to extend the 
performance. Moreover, they not only jumped and smiled and stretched out their 
arms, they also stopped spectators who tried to steal away in order to ask why they 
were leaving so soon, whether they did not like the performance, or to scold them 
for being so stingy with applause. They mingled with the spectators, shaking—or, 
in the case of female spectators, kissing—their hands, and said, “Thank you.” In 
other words, they fraternized with the spectators and tried all means to prevent 
them from leaving, extending the play into a clearly social situation and thus 
prolonging the performance. At the end, the spectators decided on the conclusion 
of the performance: it was only over when the last spectator left. This kind of 
ending unmistakably stressed that the performance had come into being through 
the encounter of actors and spectators.
By playing with and exploiting some of the possibilities that are given with the 
bodily co-presence of actors and spectators, the interplay between the performative 
and the semiotic dimension was also highlighted. It was the bodily experience 
of such co-presence which led to transformations of the physiological, affective, 
energetic, and motor states of the spectators and, following from that, to the semiotic 
processes by which spectators tried to make sense of such an experience.
The materiality of the performance
This interplay was also decisive with regard to the materiality of the 
performance as will be shown with regard to spatiality and corporeality. 
The space
The playing area on the stage was formed by an almost empty space. In the 
back, where the curtain usually hangs, and at the right side, there were screens on 
which ﬁlm clips were shown as, for instance, pictures of a landscape in spring, ﬁlmed 
from the window of a moving train, or a documentary on Nico Icon, the singer of 
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Velvet Underground. Music was played not only during the ﬁlm and video clips, but 
also in all parts of the performance. It included recordings by Velvet Underground, 
Iggy Pop, and Lou Reed, as well as Karel Gott (a Czech-German pop-singer born 
in 1939, who mostly performs easy listening music with folksy tunes and themes), 
and Arnold Schoenberg. There were only a few objects on stage: an iron bed where 
Alison was positioned during the whole performance, a baby doll, a toilet bowl, a 
Union Jack, and, on the ﬂoor, the lighting equipment mentioned above, laid out as 
it is used on construction sites. With the exception of the lights on the ﬂoor, none 
of the objects were in the playing area as the spectators made their entrance but 
were pushed on or brought in later by the three male actors.
The atmosphere which dominated the space changed several times during the 
course of the performance. Right from the start the spectators sensed a particular 
atmosphere, which was brought about by the huge dimension of the whole stage 
space with the naked wall behind only faintly lit. This, and the lighting equipment 
on the ﬂoor at the front and center stage, was reminiscent of a construction site, 
an atmosphere that was felt to be unpleasant. The atmosphere changed when the 
actors made their entrance, when the bed was pushed in, or when the toilet bowl 
was brought on stage. It also changed when the ﬁlm and video recordings were 
presented or when music ﬁlled the space. However the atmosphere changed, it was 
always felt to be something one could not escape.
As the philosopher Gernot Boehme has shown, atmosphere, although not 
bound to a particular place, pours into the space. It is not tied to the objects—or 
people—from which it seems to emanate or to those who enter the space and 
sense it physically. Usually, atmosphere is the ﬁrst thing that spectators perceive, 
“tingeing” them and thus allowing for a very speciﬁc experience of the space. An 
experience such as this cannot be explained by taking recourse to the single elements 
in space—its extension, particular objects, sounds, smells, or anything else. For it is 
not these individual elements that create the atmosphere but the interplay between 
all of them which, in theatre productions, is usually carefully calculated. Boehme 
deﬁnes atmosphere as “spaces, in that they are tinged by the presence of objects, 
of human beings or environmental constellations. They are themselves spheres of 
the presence of something, its reality in space.”2 The phrase “spheres of presence” 
describes a particular mode in which objects are perceived. Boehme explains the 
mode in which a thing appears in a particular way as present, as an “ecstasy of the 
object.” Not only its colors, smells, or sounds are conceptualized as ecstasies—i.e., 
the so-called secondary qualities of a thing—but also its primary qualities such 
as extension and form. The ecstasy of things inﬂuences their environment; they 
attract, even demand attention—as do the iron bed or the toilet bowl—and they 
appear to those who perceive them as present in a particularly intense way. They 
force themselves into their ﬁeld of attention.
Atmosphere contributes considerably to the creation of spatiality. Through 
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the atmosphere, which seems to permeate the space and the things, the things and 
the space appear to the subject who enters or who is present while it changes, as 
present in a highly emphatic sense. Not only do they present themselves in their 
so-called primary and secondary qualities; moreover, in the atmosphere, they even 
invade the body of the perceiving subject—which is mostly experienced through 
light, smells, and sound. For the spectator is not confronted with an atmosphere, 
is not distanced from it; rather, s/he is surrounded by it, s/he is permeated by it. In 
this sense, atmosphere is something which is physically sensed.
On the other hand, an atmosphere is able to work on the perceiving subject 
in a particular way because for the subject it connects with particular meanings 
which contribute to the feelings of, for example, uneasiness, awkwardness, or 
threat. As a result, the subject will accord various meanings to the atmosphere 
which it senses. It may well be that the particular shade of the atmosphere sensed 
deviates from any that have already been experienced in one respect or other. Thus 
the subject is challenged to ﬁnd a new meaning which will inform the experience 
of the atmosphere at a later date, when it is sensed again. Therefore, atmosphere 
appears as a kind of phenomenon in which the performative and the semiotic 
dimensions are intertwined in a way that it is hard to separate them—and possible 
only for heuristic reasons.
The actor’s body
Because of the bodily co-presence of actors and spectators, corporeality plays 
an essential role in performances. In Trainspotting this was not only effective 
when one of the actors went up to a spectator and addressed him or her directly, 
intimidating by his mere physical presence. It dominated the performance right 
from the very ﬁrst entrance of the actors. The three male actors/junkies sat down 
side by side and ﬂung their words out in a way that what they said was almost not 
intelligible. Instead, how they uttered it had an immediate effect on the spectators. 
The rhythm of their “choric” speech, the volume, the particular quality of the 
voices, the harmony or disharmony of their voices, and most of all the energy of 
the speakers had a physiological, affective, and energetic effect on the spectators. 
It seemed as if a stream of energy emanated from the actors, transferred onto the 
spectators, and energized them in their turn. In a particular way and with a particular 
intensity the actors were experienced as PRESENT.
What was sensed here was the phenomenal body of the actors, not their semiotic 
bodies that represented the junkies. While up to now the semiotic body representing 
dramatic ﬁgures in performances has attracted and received much attention, the 
phenomenal body of actors and spectators, i.e., their bodily being-in-the-world, has 
only seldom come into view. This is all the more surprising since the phenomenal 
body and the semiotic body are inextricably bound to each other; it is possible to 
think of the phenomenal body without referring to the semiotic body but not the 
other way round. It seems productive to relate them to one another via the concept 
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of embodiment.3 By embodiment I do not mean the process of lending one’s own 
body temporarily to something mental (an idea, a concept, a meaning, or even a 
bodiless spirit), which needs a body to articulate itself and gain presence. Rather, 
the term embodiment aims at the bodily processes by which the phenomenal 
body generates itself as a particular body and at the same time generates speciﬁc 
meanings. Thus, the actor brings forth and presents his phenomenal body in a very 
speciﬁc way through a process of embodiment which is sometimes experienced as 
PRESENCE. At the same time, he produces a dramatic ﬁgure, for example, Frank. 
In the performance, PRESENCE and the dramatic ﬁgure do not exist outside the 
particular process of embodiment by which the actor brings them into existence; 
rather, they are brought forth by them.
Perception and Production of Meaning
As already indicated, this interplay of the semiotic and the performative 
dimensions has consequences for the processes of perception and meaning 
generation which the spectators perform. To perceive the body, the things, and the 
space in their speciﬁc presence does not mean to perceive them as meaningless. 
Instead, all of these phenomena are perceived as something. We are not dealing 
with a non-speciﬁc stimulus here, mere sensorial data, but with a perception of 
something as something. In my perception, the objects appear in their particular 
phenomenality—the iron bed as an iron bed or the toilet bowl as a toilet bowl. These 
objects signify that which they appear to be. Their self-referentiality, accordingly, 
is not to be described as the mediation of a given meaning or as a desemantization 
of a sign but as a process of a very particular kind of production of meaning. This 
process is performed as the perception of a phenomenon in its particular materiality, 
in its phenomenal being. Perceiving and the generation of meaning, in this case, 
are performed in and by the very same act. Meaning is brought forth by and in the 
act of perceiving. In other words, in this case we do not perceive something ﬁrst 
and then—in an act of interpretation—attribute the meaning of something else to 
it. Rather, the act of perceiving something as something is performed at the same 
time as the process of producing its meaning as this particular phenomenal being. 
I call this kind of perception the order of presence.
From this, I distinguish quite another kind of perception and production of 
meaning, namely, the order of representation. To perceive the actor’s physicality 
in its bodily being-in-the-world lays the foundation for the order of presence. To 
perceive it as a sign for a dramatic ﬁgure or another symbolic order establishes the 
order of representation. When Kathrin Angerer takes the baby doll in her arms and 
rocks it, the doll is perceived as a sign for Alison’s baby. When the cloth on the 
ﬂoor is identiﬁed by the spectator as the Union Jack, it is perceived as a symbol 
of the United Kingdom. And when the actors take it from the ﬂoor and stuff it into 
the toilet bowl, the spectators will perceive this as a sign process to which different 
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meanings may be attributed—whether as something the dramatic ﬁgures want to use 
for cleaning the toilet bowl or to express an act of contempt for what the ﬂag stands 
for, or whether the director wanted to take a stance in political theatre or something 
else again. While the ﬁrst order produces meanings regarding the phenomenal being 
of the perceived, the second order brings forth meanings which, in their sum total, 
strive to constitute the dramatic ﬁgure or another symbolic order.
During the performance of Trainspotting—as is usual in a performance—the 
spectator’s perception oscillated between both orders of perception. For instance, as 
long as Hendrik Arnst communicated with the other actors, he was mainly perceived 
as Frank, although his very peculiar physicality drew the attention of the spectator 
to his phenomenal body from time to time, to his particular bodily being-in-the-
world. When he went up to the scaffolding and addressed a spectator with abuse or 
threats, it was rather his bodily being-in-the-world that was perceived. In this way, 
the spectator’s perception was forced to shift from perceiving the semiotic body to 
perceiving the phenomenal body and vice versa. The moment the shift took place, 
a rupture occurred, a discontinuity manifested itself. A state of instability came 
into being that placed the perceiving subjects between the two orders, transferred 
them into a state of inbetweenness, of liminality.4
Each shift, each instability, that comes up in the course of a performance causes 
the dynamics of the process of perception to take another turn. The more often a 
shift happens, the more often the perceiving subjects begin to wander between two 
worlds, between two orders of perception. They increasingly become aware of their 
inability to cause, steer, and control the shifts. They may consciously try to adjust 
their perception anew—to the order of presence or to the order of representation. 
Very soon, however, they will become aware that the shift takes place even if they 
do not intend it, that it simply happens, befalls them, that they are moved between 
the two orders without wanting or being able to prevent it. At that moment, the 
spectators experience their own perception as emergent, as withdrawn from their 
will and control, and yet as an action performed consciously. That is to say that 
the shift draws the attention of the perceiving subject to the process of perception 
itself as well as to its particular dynamics. At the moment of shift, the process of 
perception itself becomes conspicuous, thereby self-conscious, and in itself the 
object of perception. The perceiving subject begins to perceive itself as perceiving 
subject. That is a performative as well as semiotic process in itself and produces 
new meanings which, in turn, generate other meanings and so forth. In this way, 
the process of perception continuously takes another turn. What is perceived and 
what meanings are produced become less and less predictable. The perceiving 
subjects become aware that the meanings are not conveyed to them but that it is they 
themselves who produce them and that they could have generated quite a different 
set of meanings if the shift from one order to the other would have happened earlier, 
later, or less frequently.
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The performance as event—aesthetic experience as liminal experience
From these different kinds of interplay between the performative and the 
semiotic in performance it can be concluded that a performance cannot be considered 
a work of art but an art event. Since a performance comes into being by way of the 
interaction between actors and spectators, since it brings forth itself in and through 
an autopoietic process, it is impossible to label it a work. For when the autopoietic 
process comes to an end, the performance does not remain as its result; rather, the 
performance has come to an end, too. It is over and therefore irretrievably lost. It 
exists only as and in the process of its performance; it exists only as event.
The performance as event—contrary to the mise-en-scène—is unique and 
cannot be repeated. It is impossible for exactly the same constellation between 
actors and spectators to occur another time. As has been shown with reference to 
Trainspotting, the response of the spectators and their effect on the actors and other 
spectators will be different with each and every performance. A performance is also 
to be understood as an event in the sense that no one participant can completely 
control it, that it simply happens to them—particularly to the spectators. This holds 
true not only with respect to the consequences of the bodily co-presence of actors 
and spectators, but also regarding the particular presentness of the phenomena as 
well as the emergence of meaning. As explained above concerning the shift of 
perception, it also befalls the perceiving subjects and transfers them into a state of 
betwixt and between, into a state of liminality.
Moreover, the particular eventness of performance is characterized by a strange 
collapse of oppositions. The participants in a performance experience themselves 
as subjects who co-determine its course and, at the same time, are determined by it. 
They live through the performance as an aesthetic as well as a social process in the 
course of which relationships are negotiated, power struggles fought, communities 
established and dissolved. Through embodiment, the actors bring forth the body 
as phenomenal as well as semiotic, and produce presence as well as meaning. The 
spectators’ perception follows the order of presence as well as that of representation. 
This is to say that what is traditionally held to be an opposition in Western cultures, 
which is grasped by pairs of dichotomous concepts—such as autonomous subject 
vs. subject determined by others, art vs. social reality, presence vs. representation, 
the performative vs. the semiotic—is not experienced in the mode of either-or but 
in that of an as-well-as in performance. The so-called oppositions collapse, the 
dichotomies dissolve.
The moment this happens, when one category can also be taken for another, our 
attention is attracted by the passage from one state to the other, by the instability, 
which, in its turn, is experienced as an event. In the space between these opposites, 
an interval opens up. The “betwixt and between” which Turner stresses with regard 
to ritual,5 thus becomes a privileged category for the aesthetics of performance. It 
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points to the threshold between the spaces, to the state of liminality into which the 
performance transfers all those who participate in it.
Since such pairs of dichotomous concepts serve not only as tools for the 
description and cognition of the world but also as regulators for our actions 
and behavior, their destabilization not only upsets our perception of the world, 
ourselves, and others but also shatters the rules and norms that guide our behavior. 
Different frames can be deduced from the pairs of concepts, for instance, “This 
is theatre/art” or “This is a social or political situation.” Such frames prescribe an 
adequate behavior in the situation they encompass. By letting opposite or only 
different frames collide, by thus allowing different, even completely opposite values 
and claims to stand side by side so that they are all valid while at the same time 
they annul each other, performances create liminal situations. They transport the 
spectators between all these rules, norms, orders—sometimes they even transfer 
them into a crisis.
The performance transfers the spectators into a state, which alienates them 
from their everyday life and from the norms and rules valid in it. Such a state can 
be experienced as a pleasure as well as a torment. The transformations undergone 
by the subjects can be most diverse. Mainly, they are temporary transformations, 
which last only for a limited time span in the performance. These include changes in 
the body’s physiological, affective, energetic, and motor states, a well as changes in 
status such as those from the status of a spectator to that of an actor, or the building 
up of a community between actors and spectators or only among the spectators. 
Such changes take place during the performance and are perceptible; after the 
performance has come to an end, however, they usually do not continue. This marks 
the difference between liminal states in ritual and in artistic performance. While 
in a ritual the transformation undergone is irreversible and the change of status 
requires social acceptance, this is not the case in an artistic performance. From 
this, it follows that although both ritual and aesthetic experience can be deﬁned as 
liminal experience, they are by no means the same. While in a ritual the state of 
liminality is the path to gain a new status or identity, in an artistic performance it is 
an end in itself. However, although aesthetic experience does not result in a socially 
accepted change of status and identity, it may well cause a change in the perception 
of reality, self, and others in individual participants which will also inﬂuence this 
individual’s action and behavior. This applies not only to the artists involved but 
also to the spectators. In this sense, the event may result in a transformation of the 
participants, which can even outlast the end of the performance.
As has become evident, performances always have a performative and a 
semiotic dimension. Both interact constantly, so that it is sometimes impossible 
to distinguish one clearly from the other. However, in the mise-en-scène of a 
performance as well as in the perception of individual spectators there may be a 
tendency to privilege one over the other. For instance, particular staging strategies 
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may be intended and applied that strive for privileging one dimension and for 
guiding the spectator’s perception in such a way that either the performative mode 
outweighs the semiotic one or vice versa. Nonetheless, such guidance does not often 
prove successful, and spectators may respond in an unpredictable way. On the other 
hand, there will always be spectators who tend to privilege one dimension, even if 
the staging strategies privilege the other. Whatever they perceive, they will either 
ﬁrst ask what it means or, on the contrary, try to get immersed in the atmosphere, 
respond to the stream of energy which emanates from an actor and allows them to 
be energized, and vibrate with rhythms set by the mise-en-scène, without asking 
for meanings. In both cases, the rather neglected dimension will also always be 
effective since, as we have seen, both are inextricably intertwined.
This has to be kept in mind when undertaking a performance analysis. It 
depends on the leading question, the main problem, or the initial hypothesis as to 
whether the analysis will consider both dimensions equally well or one more than 
the other. In any case, it is wise to consider both even if to a different degree and 
in differing depth. For we are never to forget that it is the particular interplay of the 
performative and the semiotic dimension which constitutes performance.
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